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BOOK REVIEW
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

By Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-

versity Press, 1977. Pp. 483.

$15.00.

JOHN E. SEMONCHEt

Raoul Berger's last two books, on impeachment' and executive
privilege,2 were published just as those subjects were becoming matters
of great concern in the latter months of the Nixon administration. In

Impeachment, he persuasively argued that the constitutional process
was designed to be political, not judicial, and that impeachable offenses

are not limited to indictable crimes. That work was well addressed to
the current debate, but when Berger turned his hand to executive privilege, he labeled it "a constitutional myth"3 and put his argument beyond the pale of the contemporary controversy. Now in Government
by Judiciary,4 Berger uses questionable premises to conclude that the

United States Supreme Court is subverting our system of law and posing a dire threat to our democratic system.
Subtitling his book, "The Transformation of the Fourteenth

Amendment," Berger claims that through careful scrutiny of the com-

mittee reports and debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress5 the meaning
of privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection can be
precisely fixed. The amendment's first section, 6 he says, was exclu-

sively an attempt to translate the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 18667
t Professor of History, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B. 1954, Brown
University; M.A. 1955, Ph.D. 1962, Northwestern University; LL.B. 1967, Duke University.
1. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
2. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).
3. Id.
4. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 6 (1977).
5. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess. (1865-1866).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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into suitable constitutional language. 8 Rejecting the Supreme Court's
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873,1 Berger argues that the
privileges and immunities clause' was intended to embrace the fundamental rights of personal security, the liberty to move and travel, and
the right to own and transfer property." The equal protection guarantee, 12 he continues, was added solely to assure that laws touching these
fundamental rights would be nondiscriminatory, 3 and the due process
clause 14 was added to assure access to the state courts. 15 Having thus
confined the language of the amendment's first section, the author concludes that the Supreme Court is obligated in a government of laws and
under our theory of the separation of powers to honor this original
understanding.' 6
What such a reading means in practical terms is that virtually all
of the Court's work under the fourteenth amendment, including the
striking down of segregation,' 7 the ordering of legislative reapportionment, 18 and the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause,' 9 can be described as usurpations of power by a tribunal
that has transformed a government of the people into a government by
the judiciary. The passivity of the public in light of this shocking
transformation is, according to Berger, the result of a subterfuge perpetrated by a Court that has alternately falsified the historical record and
improperly rejected it as hopelessly ambiguous. Through such legal
legerdemain, he concludes, the Justices have illegally written their
views of a good society into the law.
Assuming for the moment that if broad words in the Constitution
can be given precision in terms of the process that gave them birth then
that meaning should control future adjudication, the question is, has
8. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 22-36.

9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, quoted in note 6 supra.
11. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 36.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, quoted in note 6 supra.
13. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 191.
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I, quoted in note 6 supra.
15. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 212.
16. Id. at 407-10.
17. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy guarantee); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment-jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of opposing

witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment-right to counsel); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).
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Berger conclusively determined the meaning of the key phrases in the
fourteenth amendment? The answer clearly is that he has not. The
author's first mistake stems from his assumption that determining the
meaning of a constitutional amendment involves the same methodology as determining the meaning of a statute. Resort is made to legislative history to clarify ambiguous words in a statute because it is quite
proper to interpret the statute in accordance with congressional intent.
Should the Supreme Court affront that understanding, Congress need
only amend the statute to overcome the prospective effect of the Court's
mistake. With a constitutional amendment, however, the process is
much more complex. Congress can only recommend a change in the
fundamental law to the effective agents of ratification-the state legislatures.20 In submitting a proposal to the states, Congress transmits no
lexigraphical guide. If, then, we are to seek the original understanding
of the amendment, must we not investigate the debates in the state legislatures? Berger is oblivious to this problem.
In addition, the author's claim for a limited reading of the first
section is further weakened by the fact that the amendment was rejected not only by all but one of the former states of the Confederacy
but also by a number of other states as well. 2 It was this recalcitrance
of states that had remained loyal to the Union that necessitated the use
of force in the South to ensure the necessary votes for ratification. The
northern state legislatures could hardly have taken exception to the
other sections of the amendment; it was the first section with its potential for altering the dimensions of the pre-war federal system that provoked resistance, including the attempts to rescind ratification in Ohio
and New Jersey.22
If Berger has not established that the terms of the first section had
precision in the eyes of both the proposers and the ratifiers of the
amendment, has he at least established that the congressional record
supports his limited reading? Once again, the answer is no. Plunging
into the legislative history as an advocate, the author does not hesitate
to avoid or downplay certain material, or worry when a consistent interpretation must be sacrificed to advance his argument.
First, Berger generally excludes the comments of Democrats, assuming that their objections to the wording were all born of a desire to
exaggerate the expansive potentiality of the amendment and thereby
20.

U.S. CONST. art. V.
21. J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192 (1956).
22. Id. at 192-93.
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secure its defeat. Though there is plausibility in this assumption, is it
not strange that many Democratic protests against the general language
so clearly anticipated later interpretations of the amendment by both
Court and Congress? And did not such comments give the Republican
majority sufficient notice that such phrases as due process and equal
protection could be expanded in the future beyond whatever consensus
then existed? Certainly the men in Congress were not ignorant of the
fact that our history had already demonstrated that the interpreters,
and not the framers, of constitutional language determine its meaning.
Second, Berger alternates between praise and scorn in his treatment of the comments of Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio and
Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan, two of the most important Republican spokesmen on the amendment's first section. When the
words of these legislative leaders do not support the author's views, he
pronounces their comments confused, idiosyncratic, or out of step with
the Republican majority.23
Third, Berger interprets the absence of comment after a speech
inconsistently. In some instances, silence means profound agreement;
in others, it is interpreted as a total rejection of the speaker's views.
Further instances of such shaping of the material can be identified, but
it should be clear that conclusions drawn from such a survey of the
legislative history are intimately related to what the investigator is
seeking.
In defending his view that the amendment's first section simply
wrote the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the fundamental law, Berger
responds to an obvious question: If this was the intent, why did Congress avoid the statutory language? The author's answer is revealing.
He says that in a constitution, prolixity should be avoided in favor of
"utmost compression."24 In insisting that the translation was precise
and clear, Berger reveals his unsophisticated understanding of semantics. When specific protections are translated into general terms, which
then become the sole constitutional standard, such terms acquire a life
of their own. In other words, the cost of the translation comes at a
considerable sacrifice of precision and concreteness. Such words are
malleable; they resist narrow and constricted boundaries. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes recognized so well, "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
23. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 145.
24. Id. at 39.
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time in which it is used."2 5 That the terms of the amendment's first
section had a precise meaning at the time of their addition to the Constitution remains debatable, but even if they did, there was no way to
ensure the preservation of that meaning. Nevertheless, Berger perversely clings to the view that the meaning of "due process" and "equal
protection" was implacably fixed in 1866.
From the current debate over the implications of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment back to the framing of the Constitution,
there has been a clear recognition that the meaning and applications of
general wording cannot be determined fully and that future generations must be trusted to exercise their interpretive wisdom. In the convention in Philadelphia in 1787 a delegate asked for some clarification
26
of the meaning of the term "direct tax"; he received no response.
And when those delegates submitted their work to the people, they sent
along no annotations or explanations. The Framers were willing to
trust the future with the language that they had penned. Early interpreters in the legislative and judicial branches had to chart their own
way. This early experience set the pattern for the development of our
constitutional history and gradually the Supreme Court emerged as the
definitive interpreter of the Constitution.
Much of Berger's attack miscarries because he ignores the practical realities of our legal-governmental system. By measuring the
Court's work against abstractions rather than within the context of the
inconsistencies of democratic practice, he has spun a theory of high
conspiracy. So obsessed is the author with the spectre he creates that
he argues that the Supreme Court was not intended to play any role at
all in interpreting the fourteenth amendment. He reaches this conclusion by reading the fifth section of the amendment as conferring upon
Congress the exclusive power to enforce its provisions.2 7 Such a
strange interpretation can only be born of a fundamental misconception of how constitutional provisions enter into a course of litigation
that demands judicial resolution.
Despite the highly subjective nature of Berger's investigation, most
students of the legislative record of the thirty-ninth Congress would
accept the view that the Republican majority in Congress had a narrower conception of the range of the first section's three clauses than
25. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
26. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 350 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
27. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 229. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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that taken by the Supreme Court in the middle third of the twentieth
century. But such a conclusion is hardly surprising, for the survival of
our eighteenth century constitution is as much a tribute to subsequent
generations as it is to the Framers. The key to the document's survival
has been interpretation, a process of renewal that assumes that the
words of the Constitution can still provide guidance in an ever changing society. Charged with interpreting the Constitution in response to
rival claims based upon its wording, the Justices must evaluate arguments in relation to the general guidelines of the fundamental law.
Through this process, the Court makes new law. We should not flinch
from this realization, for the interpreters of law are as much law makers as those who drafted its terms. Though such a conclusion does not
square with the theory of a separation of powers, it is a fact of our
governmental life.
Often Justices have felt uncomfortable with their task of reinterpreting the Constitution and have desperately sought a rationale, no
matter how tenuous, that could be partially anchored in the past. Berger's criticism of the Justices for these contrived rationales hits the
mark, for the Court, though engaged in no conspiracy, has been wary
of directly confronting its lawmaking function. We ask the Supreme
Court to make these decisions, however, because we have been and still
are unwilling to entrust legislative branches with the full power to rule.
The Court has a policymaking role not because its collective membership is engaged in a conspiracy against the American people but rather
because very early in our history as a nation, as the perceptive French
observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, observed, we began to frame our policy conflicts in legal terms and sought their resolution within the judicial branch.28 Despite diatribes directed against its power and
recurrent comment about the incompatibility of its power with democratic ideology, the Supreme Court survives as an important policymaker in our society because we have chosen to endow it with such
authority. Contrary to many of the institution's critics, however, the
Court does not operate in a vacuum; constitutional history demonstrates that both internal and external constraints establish certain
boundaries upon its policymaking role.
When Berger accuses the High Bench of subverting the rule of
law, he says that such action carries the "hallmark of Hitlerism and
Stalinism. '29 Such distortion, misunderstanding and overstatement
28. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 92-97 (3d Am. ed. 1839) (n.p. n.d.).
29. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 412.
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are characteristic of the book, which, despite the author's protestations,
is a polemic written from a theoretical stance out of touch with the
practical realities of our constitutional system. Except for the passion
of his argument, there is little new in Government by Judiciary;even the
title is borrowed from a 1932 publication by Louis B. Boudin.3 0 Moreover, the book is neither well organized nor smoothly written, characteristics that are accentuated by Berger's running arguments with some
of the writers who have investigated the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court is not divorced from the society it serves. It is
not a sacrosanct body isolated from substantial professional and lay
criticism. But neither the Court nor the public is well served by books,
such as Government by Judiciary,that generate heat with no accompanying light.

30. L.

BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

(1932).

